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Abstract
Taking the example of the liberalization of the electricity supply industry, the
article analyzes the impact of EU institutions on the interest definitions of its
large member states. Confronting central tenets of the intergovernmental
approach, I suggest that member state executives act within the limits of
bounded rationality and do not always represent clear and fixed preferences in
EU negotiations. Based on the examples of France and Germany, I show that
national interest definitions may change greatly during the course of the
decision-making process. In the EU, institutional principles, policy-concepts
and fairness criteria guide member state orientations and hinder the pursuit of
unilateral advantages. Incremental negotiation techniques within the Council of
Ministers can induce learning processes and a reassessment of domestic
situations. Furthermore, even if as a result of these techniques EU legal acts
contain several flexibilization elements, they can trigger behavioral changes that
clearly surpass their regulatory content.RSC 2000/26 © 2000 Rainer EisingRSC 2000/26 © 2000 Rainer Eising
Introduction
In 1996, after eight long years of controversial negotiations, the European
Union (EU)/European Community (EC)1 agreed to liberalize the EU electricity
markets. This reform was a watershed in the evolution of a sector that had until
then been exempted from competition. The outcome is puzzling, however,
because member states’ positions on this issue differed markedly. As many
member states defended their established sectoral structures in the EU
negotiations, several well-informed commentators doubted that they would ever
be able to agree on a directive.2 And after the passing of the act the EU reform
was qualified as the least common denominator of negotiations between the
large member states France, Germany, and Britain.3
In contrast to this line of reasoning this article demonstrates that the
regulatory reform cannot be satisfactorily explained by approaches which
assume that the member states form their interest definitions solely on the basis
of their domestic situations and defend them rigidly in the Council negotiations.
The intergovernmental approach is most outspoken on this issue: member state
actors form their preferences on the basis of domestic economic situations or
due to the pressure of domestic economic interest groups.4 However, this
reasoning is not exclusive to intergovernmentalism but is also prevalent in
many policy analyses of the European Union. For example, in their analysis of
EU environmental policy making, Adrienne Héritier and her collaborators
assume that the large member states attempt to transfer their regulations, their
regulatory culture, and their regulatory practices to the European level to limit
adaptation costs and to strengthen the competitiveness of their national
industries.5 Thus, even if these approaches assess the autonomy of the
supranational actors differently influential strands of the literature on EU
decision making assume that the member states form their preferences
independently from EU-level interactions.
In line with the central assumptions of these approaches, the
overwhelming majority of member states and sectoral utilities opposed EU
                                          
1 I use these terms interchangeably even if the article refers solely to the first pillar of the
European Union, namely the European Community.
2 Padgett 1992; Ortwein 1996.
3 In her study on the evolution of EU energy policy, Janne Haaland Matláry clearly subscribes
to an intergovernmental explanation of electricity liberalization. In her view, the final
compromise reflects „national differences in market structures, energy policies and market
philosophies“ in Great Britain, France and Germany (Matláry 1997: 159-160).
4 Moravcsik 1998.
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liberalization for a long time and tried to limit its scope. Therefore, these
approaches explain the resistance towards the sectoral reform quite well but do
not account for the unanimous agreement of the member states on the need for a
fundamental reform. They have only a limited importance for explaining the
outcome because they conceptualize the preference formation of the member
states too statically. To provide for a more adequate explanation of the
regulatory reform, I treat the question of whether the member states have fixed
or variable preferences as a matter for empirical investigation and endogenize
into the analysis their processes of preference formation at the EU level.
The theoretical framework therefore departs in three crucial aspects from
the intergovernmental approach. It rests on the concept of bounded rationality,
on  neo-institutional premises, and on theories of policy learning. The
intergovernmental conception of actors’ rationality is inconclusive. On the one
hand, it asserts that the member states do not have a complete rationality.6 But
on the other, all the actors have very little difficulty obtaining relevant
information, processing it, and developing consistent preferences. Transaction
costs for obtaining relevant information are low and the actors therefore enjoy
“complete information”.7 As a result, intergovernmentalism ascribes a very high
degree of rationality to all actors enabling them to define clearly the situational
logic at work. I depart from this assumption and start from the premise that
human beings, organizations and nation states face substantial “informational
and computational limits on rationality” so that even all “intendedly rational
behavior is behavior within constraints”.8 Two dimensions of the boundedness
of rationality are of particular relevance and give rise to two different modes of
interaction. First, the member states cannot fully assess the responses of other
actors to their own moves which, combined with a lack of control over the
evolution of the EU policy agenda,9 may lead them to step back from their
initial positions, re-order their preferences, and newly position themselves.
Second, as a result of issue complexity and as a consequence of their
multidimensional domestic structures, member states are often unsure whether
their initial preferences are based on ‘correct’ assessments of the adequacy of
the EU policies at hand.10
                                          
6 Moravcsik 1998: 23.
7 Moravcsik 1998: 66.
8  March 1978: 590.
9 Much of the literature on EU policymaking centers on one aspect of this argument, namely
the relative autonomy of the EU institutions. For a recent collection of articles that stress the
autonomous role of the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, see
Sandholtz/Stone Sweet 1998.
10 In his historical institutional analysis of EU social policymaking, Paul Pierson also points to
the change of member state preferences. However, as he traces such changes mainly to factorsRSC 2000/26 © 2000 Rainer Eising 5
This second dimension of the boundedness of rationality can give rise to
learning processes that may change interest definitions11 even when these are
deeply rooted in domestic structures and practices. As a result of new
information embodied in a Commission proposal and due to the growing
information on the situation in the other member states, member states subject
their domestic arrangements to detailed scrutiny which may lead them to re-
evaluate their domestic settings. Their voluntary attempts to change the goals or
the instruments of EU or domestic political programs as a response to new
information revealed in EU level interactions may be considered to be good
indicators of such instances of policy learning.12 In sum, the course of
negotiations in the EU is not just marked by “the relative bargaining power of
important governments”13 even if such power is part and parcel of the process.
Given uncertainty over their preferred outcome, processes of policy deliberation
and policy learning also shape the interaction among member states.
The intergovernmental approach largely discards institutional factors in
its explanatory framework. This holds both for the autonomous role of
supranational organizations (the European Commission, the European
Parliament, and the European Court of Justice) and for the ways in which the
EU institutions structure the behavior of the different actors. Apart from
assuming an almost complete rationality on part of the actors which decreases
the need for institutions that reduce uncertainty, shape expectations and guide
behavior, this conception results largely from a claim about the absence of
institutions in EU ‘constitutional’ policymaking: “Unlike the EC’s everyday
legislative process…treaty amendments are subject to essentially no procedural
constraints”.14 Assuming a bounded rationality and focusing on ‘daily’ decision-
making, I argue that EU institutions have a much larger role to play. The EU
institutional setting forms an important arena for member state negotiations,
which greatly aided the liberalization of the electricity supply industry.15
Certainly, the EU institutions do not determine actors’ behavior or decisions but
                                                                                                                                   
exogeneous to the EU (1996: 139-142), his argument does not seriously question the
intergovernmental account of the member states‘ preference formation.
11 I use the terms interest definitions and preferences interchangeably even if the term
preferences implies, in its generic connotation, a rank ordering of interests.
12 On the topic of policy deliberation and policy learning, see Hall 1993; Majone 1993;
Sabatier 1993.
13 Moravcsik 1998: 3.
14 Moravcsik 1998: 61.
15 There are several strands of neo-institutional approaches. For useful overviews, see
Hall/Taylor 1996; March/Olsen 1998. For some applications to the European Union, see
Pierson 1996; Scharpf 1985; Pollack 1996.RSC 2000/26 © 2000 Rainer Eising 6
they do form important normative and cognitive frameworks.16 They provide
both standards for appropriate behavior and standards for the assessing the
consequentiality of EU legal acts. As a result, they have a twofold impact on the
formation and pursuit of preferences by member states. By structuring the
decision-making process, they allow for the selection of eligible preferences
and appropriate solutions whilst hindering the pursuit of unilateral advantages.
They thus remove certain options from the set of feasible outcomes.
Furthermore, EU decision-making practices can stimulate genuine learning
processes and preference changes that are based on the re-evaluation of
domestic settings both in the light of Commission proposals and in the light of
the situation in other member states. This can enlarge the ‘bargaining space’or
shift its position.
Moreover, informal institutional factors can often have a greater impact
on the pursuit and formation of preferences than the formal decision making
powers of the supranational organizations and the formal EU decision
procedures.17 Institutional principles, policy concepts and fairness criteria shape
the orientations and behavior of the member states and also the space for
negotiation outcomes. Incremental negotiation techniques in the Council
generate negotiation dynamics and processes of policy learning.18 They change
the set of feasible outcomes and result in policy solutions typical of the EU. The
legal acts of the European Union contain pronounced flexibilization
mechanisms which allow for the resolution of conflicts and for an appropriate
implementation in different national contexts. Nevertheless, EU regulations and
directives are not a menu à la carte. They contain a core set of rules that have to
be implemented in all member states and that trigger behavioral changes beyond
their regulatory content.
The analysis focuses on the large member states Great Britain, France and
Germany. The focus on the large member states does not mean that these always
dominate EU decision-making. But if those member states that play the central
role in the intergovernmental account of the integration process change their
preferences as a result of policy learning at the EU level, less powerful member
states are likely to be at least equally receptive to such processes.
                                          
16 See March/Olsen 1989.
17 In their analyses of the EU electricity liberalization, Susanne K. Schmidt (1996) and Lisa
Conant (1999) emphasize the competition policy mandate of the European Commission and
the supporting role of the ECJ in this policy area.
18 Thomas Risse and Harald Müller argue more generally that „[a]rguing can be
conceptualized as a micro-mechanism for learning in a social interaction environment“ (1999:
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The article is set up as follows. First, the decision-making process in the
liberalization of the EU electricity markets is flashed out. Second, this process
is analyzed by means of an intergovernmental approach to illustrate which
elements cannot be covered by this theoretical perspective. Thirdly, the main
part of the article demonstrates the importance of informal mechanisms of
conflict resolution in the EU and illustrates that they generate specific
negotiation dynamics and processes of regulatory learning. The conclusion
summarizes the key points of the article and provides evidence that the impact
of EU directives can greatly surpass their regulatory content.
1 The Decision Making Process to Liberalize the Electricity
Supply Industry
Until the mid-1980s, the EU institutions played no role in the regulation of the
electricity supply industry even though they had some legal bases in the three
treaties of the EC: EURATOM, ECSC and EEC. Thus far, there is no legal
provision for a Community energy policy in the EC treaty. Due to the emphasis
placed by the member states on their national autonomy in this sector, the role
of the Commission’s Energy Directorate General (DG XVII) was mostly
restricted to the formulation of studies and forecasts.
It was only with the Internal Market Programme that the liberalization
rationale was extended to those economic sectors which had previously been
exempted from competition, such as transport, telecommunications and
electricity. When the Commission drew up an inventory of obstacles to an
Internal Energy Market in 1988, it identified most of them in the fields of
electricity and gas. The Commission therefore envisaged the application of
Community law to these sectors, and set as its goal free trade between member
states.19 Its inventory contained some vaguely defined plans for a
comprehensive liberalization of the two network bound energy sectors. Just one
year later, DG XVII presented some draft proposals that would introduce a few
competitive elements into these sectors, namely, directives on the transit of
electricity and gas, on price transparency throughout the Community, and on the
notification of investments. Of these proposals, the member states objected only
to the latter, their reason being the interference with private investment
decisions.20
                                          
19 Commission 1988: 20.
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After further internal preparations and controversial discussions with the
member states, the European Parliament and sectoral firms and associations, the
Commission put forward an ambitious proposal for the liberalization of the EU
electricity and gas markets.21 Following an extended debate covering both the
procedures and the content, it presented a far-reaching proposal for a directive
to create an Internal Energy Market on the basis of Article 100a (EEC).22
Earlier, the Commission had dropped plans to liberalize the sector unilaterally
on the basis of Art. 90 (3) EEC which would neither have involved the
European Parliament nor the Council of the EU. Taking as a precedent its
opening up of the telecommunications market, DG IV (Competition) had
suggested such a strategy even though the other institutions and also parts of the
Commission regarded this approach as illegitimate. In contrast to this approach,
with its directive proposal for the IEM the Commission emphasized a step-by-
step approach and the use of the co-decision procedure signalling that it wanted
to consult both the European Parliament and the Council.
The proposal aimed at a fundamental reform of the established sectoral
practices. Its core elements were intended to introduce competition mainly into
the generation of electricity, which has a 50-70 percent share in the total cost of
supply. First, distributors and large industrial firms would no longer be bound
to their ‘area supplier’ but be able to contract deliveries from other generators
by giving them statutory access to the network, in other words, third party
access (TPA). Second, all exclusive rights for the construction of power stations
and power lines would be abolished and replaced by a non-discriminatory
authorization procedure. Finally, to prevent cross-subsidies between different
activities (which might undermine competition) the management and
accounting procedures of vertically integrated utilities would be separated, a
process known as ‘unbundling’.
The directive proposals provoked widespread opposition from the utilities
and the member states. Until then, the member states’ orientations were shaped
by the long stability of their sectors which had excluded competition. In their
opinion, the radical EC proposals were incompatible with their domestic
arrangements and long standing sectoral orientations. Various member states
also feared negative economic repercussions on their sectors arising from an
opening of the markets. Only the United Kingdom and Ireland were clearly
supportive of the controversial TPA-proposal because the UK had already
liberalized its domestic sector and Ireland was considering a reform. All of the
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other member states were opposed or at least very skeptical.23 The utilities even
founded an EU trade association to defend their domestic positions. In general,
EURELECTRIC formulated a defensive posture in favor of the status quo.24
However, unlike most of the EURELECTRIC members, the British utilities
supported the Commission plans from the outset and some continental utilities
also expected advantages from liberalization, with the Dutch and several French
and Spanish distributors anxious to loosen their dependence on their suppliers.
Finally, the large industrial consumers and their associations supported the
liberalization plans.
In its first reading of the proposal, the European Parliament stressed the
traditional sectoral orientations – the maintenance of the security of supply, the
environmental implications of this sector, the need to maintain equal prices for
similar customers as well as other public service obligations of the utilities.
However, it was evident from the voting behavior of the parliamentary parties
that, in its second reading, the EP was unlikely to reach the absolute majority
required to amend or reject the Council’s common position. Thus, the
Commission included in its own amended proposal only those elements of the
EP’s position, which would not run against the spirit of market integration.25
Following the production of the amended Commission proposals, the highly
controversial discussion was continued in the Council of the European Union.
In general, the major cleavage was between those member states with highly
centralized sectors in state ownership and a preference for state planning on the
one hand, and those with more decentralized sectors who emphasized the
introduction of competition more strongly. The first group consisted mainly of
France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Belgium. In the beginning, the second group
consisted only of the United Kingdom, but they were later joined by Germany,
the Netherlands, and after their accession to the EU, Sweden and Finland.
Under French leadership, the first group of countries argued for limits to be
placed on liberalization and for some consideration to be given to the utilities’
role as service providers in the general economic interest.
During the negotiations, France and Germany were the main antagonists.
While France feared the repercussions of liberalization on its nationalized
regime, Germany dwelt on the economic consequences arising from a market
opening in the context of heterogeneous national regimes. On the one hand, the
German utilities feared an inflow of French electricity because of the high
excess capacity and price advantages of the French state monopoly Electricité
                                          
23 Handelsblatt 09.04.1992.
24 See EURELECTRIC 1992.
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de France (EDF).26 On the other hand, they worried about the closure of the
French market because of the high degree of vertical integration within EDF.
While, in the second half of the 1980s, EDF and the French government had
even supported plans for a limited opening of the EU market to turn the excess
capacity into revenues, they took a much more defensive posture when they
learned about the comprehensive reform plans of the European Commission. At
the end of the 1980s, they perceived liberalization as a threat to the fundamental
principles of the French monopolistic sectoral regime.27
To defend its sector, France even suggested its own competition model to
the Council of the EU and was able to win the support of other countries with
similar supply structures. Earlier, in late 1993, the French industry ministry had
published the results of a study on the French sectoral set-up that had largely
been triggered by the EU negotiations. The so-called Rapport Mandil concluded
that the major principles of the French sectoral regime should be preserved and
that a thorough liberalization should be rejected. However, it also recommended
that the generation and the foreign trade monopolies of EDF be abolished and
the market access of some types of independent generators be improved. On the
basis of these results, the French government proposed an alternative to the
Commission model, calling it the Single Buyer (Acheteur Unique) model.28
Thereafter, the Council asked to Commission to assess whether the
French proposal could be considered as equivalent to the Commission’s own
proposal. Accordingly, the Commission ordered a study to be undertaken by the
Energy Economics Institute of the University of Cologne. According to this
study, the French model led to far less competition than the Commission’s own
proposal,29 so that the Commission demanded major modifications to the French
Single Buyer proposal.30 Nevertheless, in principle the Council of the EU
accepted the Single Buyer model as an alternative to the model the Commission
itself had suggested. After the French proposal, the equivalence of the market
opening was at the core of the Council debate. Both competition models, it was
claimed, should guarantee a similar degree of market access, market results and
consumer choice. The intense and continuous negotiations as well as the
successive solutions to a broad variety of issues led to several changes in the
amended Commission proposal and progressively enhanced the willingness of
the member states to agree to a settlement. Due to the problem-solving and
                                          
26 See Harms 1987.
27 Agence Europe, 24 March 1995.
28 See Mathis 1995.
29 EWI 1995.
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mediating strategies in the Council debate, at the end of 1995 some member
states, namely the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, were
willing to compromise.31 However, Franco-German disagreements over the
compromise position still threatened to forestall agreement, which was only
achieved after bilateral consultations between the French and German heads of
state in mid 1996.
The European Parliament passed the directive without further changes in
late 1996. The directive provides for a progressive market opening. Between
1999 and 2003, the member states have to liberalize about 25 percent to 33
percent of their national markets. The extent of the liberalization is certainly not
as great as in the telecommunications sector.32 Nevertheless, the directive does
introduce fundamental changes to established sectoral practices.33 Even if it
allows the member states to choose between several alternatives – for instance,
the regulation of network access and the eligibility of different consumer groups
– it introduces competition into the sector and thereby fundamentally alters
established sectoral regimes. Strong modifications made to the original French
Single Buyer proposal indicate that the member states opting for this concept
will not be able to evade the aim of market integration that the directive implies.
2 The Change of Member State Preferences
2.1 National Structures and National Preferences
The intergovernmental approach rests on a few fundamental assumptions about
the preference formation of the EU member states. First, it implies that the
member states form their preferences independent of the effects of the EU
institutions. „Preferences, unlike strategies and policies, are exogenous to a
specific international environment“.34 Secondly, the issue specific preferences
the member states hold “within each negotiation” are clearly defined,35 well
ordered and stable as they are based on domestic structures or on domestic
interest coalitions.36 These assumptions will now be applied to the liberalization
                                          
31 Agence Europe 21 December 1995.
32 See S. Schmidt 1997.
33 European Parliament and Council of the European Union 1996.
34 Moravcsik 1998: 24.
35 Moravcsik 1998: 23.
36 Apart from the economic rationality criteria, Andrew Moravcsik also names geo-political
calculations (1998: 27-34). These criteria need not be addressed here because they did not
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of the electricity supply industry to illustrate that the member states’ interest
definitions do not exclusively rest on domestic economic structures or domestic
interest coalitions. Their preferences can substantially change during the course
of EU negotiations – which is the reason for the successful outcome of these
negotiations.
Prima facie, the liberalization of the electricity supply industry seems to
be a perfect case for reasoning on the basis of structural national interests. The
domestic sectoral arrangements were at the core of twentieth century
industrialization in all of the member states. The sector was marked by a very
long period of stability in all the member states. Since electricity supply is
network-bound and regarded as a natural monopoly, competition was absent
and there was a preference for national autonomy in the supply of energy
sources to the sector. Changes caused by the globalization of markets as in
telecommunications were basically absent and neither did the slow evolution of
generation technologies trigger re-assessments of the established sectoral
regimes.37 Therefore, the member states were very likely to base their
preferences on their domestic sectoral structures. The government of France
remained wedded to the infrastructure built by the state-owned utility EDF in
the postwar period – the supply of electricity by a state owned utility in
accordance with national priorities such as the development of nuclear power.
Likewise, the German government defended an institutional structure of energy
supply that had profound historical roots – sectoral arrangements were
characterized by the presence of a small number of large firms, several regional
utilities, multiple local producers, both public and private ownership, and
continued reliance on coal and nuclear energy. Of the three large member states,
only the United Kingdom was likely to opt for EU liberalization because it had
already liberalized and privatized its domestic sector.
In this situation, the member states ought to have developed clearly
defined and stable preferences about their domestic settings and EU
liberalization. However, only the United Kingdom lives up to these
expectations. In France and Germany, we can note clear changes in the national
positions and preferences.
                                                                                                                                   
approach is clear that the relationship between domestic structures, domestic interest
coalitions, and national preferences is variable and not fixed. On the one hand, economic
interest groups have an influence on the formulation of governmental policies. But on the
other, governments have to weigh these against “broad constraints set by general demands for
regulatory protection, economic efficiency, and fiscal responsibility” (Moravcsik 1998: 37).
37 Author‘s interviews with various government officials, trade associations, and firms.RSC 2000/26 © 2000 Rainer Eising 13
2.2 Bounded Rationality and Preference Changes of the Large Member
States
Between 1987 and 1990, the United Kingdom radically reformed its sectoral
arrangements.38 The Conservative government included the electricity supply
industry, which had been nationalized after the Second World War, in its
comprehensive privatization program. Modeled on the earlier reforms of
telecommunications and gas, a regulatory agency, the Office for Electricity
Regulation, was set up. Also in line with the preceding reforms, the sector was
privatized, liberalized, re-organized and highly regulated. To organize large-
scale electricity trading, the government even designed a complicated trading
mechanism, the Electricity Pool. After this national reform, the British utilities
and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) tried to transfer this model to
the EU-level and consistently supported the EU reform.39 Thus, the
intergovernmental assumptions apply to the UK without reservation.
In contrast to the British position, the French and the German interest
definitions were neither clear nor stable, they changed during the course of the
negotiations. In the context of EU negotiations, such preference changes can –
beyond attributing them to changes of exogenous technical and economic
factors40 – be traced to two sets of factors: to shifts in influence positions or
interest coalitions on the one hand and to learning processes of the actors on the
other. In the first case, which is well explained by the intergovernmental
approach, the changing influence of individual actors or shifts in the actors’
alignments lead to changes in the national preferences. In the second case, the
intergovernmental explanation is not satisfactory. If the embeddedness in EU
negotiations triggers learning processes and preference changes, both structural
and interest based theories of preference formation are insufficient.
The following analysis demonstrates that the French and the German
preference changes were not related to changes in influence positions or interest
coalitions on the domestic level but to positional changes and learning
processes induced by the European Union. In both countries, important state
actors could not foresee the implications of their initial positions and actions on
the liberalization issue. They displayed a bounded rationality that was manifest
                                          
38 See Henney 1994.
39 Author’s interviews with DTI; Electricity Association, PowerGen, National Power.
40 Since the mid-1980s, international oil and gas prices dropped and combined-cycle gas
turbines have become increasingly popular in electricity generation. These technical and
economic developments could have served as partial justifications for the liberalization of the
EU electricity market. However, none of the 51 interview partners considered them as relevant
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in two types of uncertainty. The main French actors (EDF and the Ministry of
Industry) could not foresee the reactions of other member states and the
European Commission to their initial support for a limited opening of the EU
electricity market, which later forced them to reposition themselves and to
oppose a comprehensive reform. The German Federal Economics Ministry
could not initially identify its own ‘correct’ preferences because the
Commission plans were a radically new proposal and the issues involved were
highly complex. Learning processes in the course of the Council negotiations
led to a re-assessment of the German sectoral setting and a preference change in
favor of liberalization.
In  France, the Ministry of Industry (Ministère de l’Industrie) and the
national utility Electricité de France dominated the domestic decision making
process. During the liberalization process, both actors broadly agreed on their
positions. The Ministry of Industry acted mainly as a ‘sponsoring department’
for the national monopoly utility. Those actors who favored a comprehensive
liberalization of the French sector – like the competition directorate in the
Ministry of Economics and Finance, several large industrial conglomerates and
some local distributers – did not play a major role.41 Initially, the two
protagonists emphasized their economic interests in exporting electricity to
other member states because of the high overcapacities that EDF had built up
since the oil crisis in the 1970s. As a result of its ambitious nuclear program, the
firm had now large over-capacities that could not be absorbed by the French
market. Because the cross-border electricity exchange in the EU was not based
on competition, but on the voluntary co-operation of European suppliers, EDF
faced important internal barriers to trade within the EU. For example, in the
second half of the 1980s, Spanish utilities blocked EDF’s attempts to deliver
electricity supplies to a Portuguese utility for more than two years.42 EDF’s
negotiations with large German industrial firms also ended without a success.
To give substance to its demands for a strengthening of cross-border electricity
trading, in 1988 the Ministry of Industry even called upon the Commission to
open state aid proceedings against the German government because of subsidies
granted to the hard coal sector.
However, only shortly thereafter EDF as well as the Ministry of Industry
started to oppose fervently the Commission’s initiative to liberalize electricity
when its potential repercussions on the French sectoral organization became
clearer. Facing the potential loss of its monopoly status, EDF now propagated a
co-operative increase of cross-border electricity trading in the EU as a fall back
                                          
41 Author’s interview Ministry of Economics and Finance.
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position which would leave the market situation of the incumbent utilities
virtually unaffected.43 As a consequence, the position of the Ministry of
Industry also changed: “The realization that EDF was no longer on board
dampened the French government’s enthusiasm for the IEM at around 1989”.44
Now, fundamental principles of the French electricity supply industry’s
organization came to the center of its attention.45 According to the French
actors, the Commission plans would endanger their national autonomy in
energy supply, the long term security supply based on nuclear energy, the equal
treatment of customers across the country as well as the tradition of service
public that EDF symbolized more than any other state enterprise.
With its emphasis on interest politics, intergovernmentalism can in part
explain the involuntary, instrumental adaptations of the French actors because
the Ministry of Industry’s position largely followed EDF’s turnaround.
However, even then it remains unclear why EDF changed its position. To
explicate the firm’s positional adaptation, an intergovernmentalist account
would need to take the bounded rationality of actors more into account than it
actually does. It would also need to pay more attention to the impact of the EU
agenda and the EU institutions on the national actors’ positions. Even the
largest European utility and the French Ministry of Industry could not forecast
the consequences of their initial position to demand an increase of EU cross-
border electricity trading. Both of them expected that such an increase would be
possible without major repercussions on their domestic sectoral regime. In
particular, they did not expect that the European Commission would put
forward a comprehensive scheme to liberalize the EU electricity markets in such
a radical way. In short: they could not calculate the responses of other actors to
their initial move and overrated their ability to control the political agenda of
the EU institutions. Consequently, they adapted to the dynamic evolution of a
political agenda they could no longer control and tried to limit the damage to
the French sector.
In Germany, we can note preference and positional changes of several
actors. Initially, the German actors were very hesitant with regard to European
proposals for an Internal Energy Market. The German coalition government, the
opposition parties, and the different Ministries at the federal and regional level
all took a rather negative stance. They welcomed the Commission’s decision to
opt for the co-decision procedure, which let the member states have an effective
say in the liberalization debate. But with regard to the core elements of the
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Commission proposal, they emphasized the heterogeneity of the member states’
sectoral structures and the need to maintain the long standing principles of
network-bound energies – the security of supply, the economic provision of
services, and environmental protection.46 Due to the new character of the
Commission proposals and their unpredictable consequences, established
domestic structures and rules initially guided the actors’ orientations. The
sedimentation of the sectoral institutions let the EU-plans appear as a ‘new idea’
that had to face important obstacles.47
Two developments at the beginning of the 1990s are indicative of the
status quo orientations among state actors. First, the most important
institutional arrangements of the sector – for instance, its contractual
arrangements, the sectoral exemption from competition law, and the three-tiered
set-up of local, regional and large interconnected utilities – were by and large
transferred to the new German Länder during the reunification process.48
Second, the Federal Economics Ministry wanted, mostly for symbolic reasons,
to upgrade environmental protection into a leading goal of German energy law.
However, this reform was neither intended to change regulatory standards of
environmental protection nor to introduce more competition into the electricity
sector. As late as 1991, Economics Ministry officials considered that there was
no need to change dramatically German competition rules in the electricity
sector.49 State actors were satisfied with a process of incremental reform and
had no plans to overhaul the whole electricity supply industry.
Only two years later the Federal Economics Ministry would not only
fervently support EU liberalization but would also put forward its own reform
proposals.50 The close interaction of national bureaucrats and politicians within
the EU negotiations had shifted the attitude of ministry officials towards a more
positive evaluation of competition in the energy sector. The long, intense, and
detailed debate on the advantages and disadvantages of divergent sectoral
models triggered a fundamental re-assessment of the principles that had
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informed the organization of the German electricity supply industry.51 This
learning process led to a re-evaluation of the conventional wisdom that
competition could not really work in electricity sector due its ‘special’ technical
and economic features. As a consequence, the introduction of competition was
now considered as economically more rational than the prior sectoral regime.
Thus, the leading ideas that had informed the sectoral organization and
regulation of electricity in Germany for more than 100 years changed radically.
Electricity came to be seen as a rather conventional commodity and the Ministry
developed its own reform plans for the sector.
Within the German sector, the interlocked reform debates at both the
European and the domestic level triggered positional adaptations. The German
sector consists of three different groups of firms: very large utilities, about sixty
regional utilities linked to them, and a multitude of local utilities.52 Early in the
debate, all of the three groupings and their sectoral trade association opposed
the EU reform.53 But gradually, the combined pressure for reform at two
political levels led to the erosion of consensus among the sectoral actors.54
While the local utilities ferociously opposed any kind of liberalization, the
regional and the large utilities opted for the introduction of competition as a
lesser evil. These two groups of utilities feared that the municipal firms would
be granted major exemptions from liberalization due to their linkages with
political actors in the major political parties and at the local level.55 They also
came to regard the EU liberalization as an opportunity to undermine the
municipalities’ control over local supply areas given that such an opening up of
municipal areas of supply was unlikely to come about in a national reform. The
turnaround of the large and the regional utilities formed an involuntary
positional adaptation to the changed preferences of the state actors, which
improved the likelihood that both the European and the domestic reform plans
would succeed.
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The intergovernmental approach can only very partially account for the
changes that took place in Germany. It can partly explain the positional
adaptations of the large and the regional utilities that saw the EU reform in part
as a ‘window of opportunity’ to open up the municipal firms’ supply areas
given that they could no longer defend their own monopoly status.56 However,
the Federal Economics Ministry’s preferences evolved not exogeneously to the
EU negotiations but must be regarded as a result of a learning process initiated
by these negotiations. This makes an intergovernmental explanation
unsatisfactory.
In sum, with its emphasis on domestic structures and interest alliances,
the intergovernmental approach is able to account for important elements of the
member states’ preference formation. Nevertheless, even in the French case it
would need to consider more than it does so far the effects of bounded
rationality and of a lack of member state control over the EU political agenda.
Moreover, in Germany, EU reform opened up options to state actors that led to
a fundamental re-assessment of the domestic sectoral structure.
Intergovernmentalism cannot satisfactorily account for this learning process.
Therefore, the following section analyzes the effects the EU institutional setting
has on the member states’ preferences.
3 Negotiation Dynamics and Regulatory Learning in the EU
3.1 The Institutional Setting of the EU
European integration has entailed fundamental changes in the institutional set-
up the member state actors and the sectoral utilities are embedded in. For the
electricity sector this transformation was particularly profound. The frequency
of the energy group meetings within the Council of the EU increased from three
or four times a year at the end of the 1980s to once or even twice a week during
the liberalization debate. The high density of interactions in the context of
specific negotiation techniques and institutional principles contributed to the
emergence of social norms and impinged upon the member states’ definitions of
interests. This section shows that the interaction of the member states within the
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European Union generates informal mechanisms of consensus formation that
further the resolution of conflicts, trigger learning processes and generate
problem solutions typical for the European Union.
The EU’ institutional set-up differs markedly from that of the member
state polities.57 It is characterized by a multi-level structure, the combination of
supranational and intergovernmental elements, and a strong role for the
judiciary. During the policy cycle, the EU’s actors are largely restricted to
agenda setting and policy formulation, whereas implementation is organized by
the member states. Additional factors enhance the complexity of actor relations.
The territorial and functional representatives come from fifteen widely differing
systems. Therefore, actor constellations are remarkable for their heterogeneity
and fluidity. Furthermore, the competencies of the political actors vary
according to different procedures and they also change in different phases of the
policy cycle. Neither the Council or individual member states nor the European
Commission or the European Parliament enjoy complete control over the
process or the substance of decision making. Throughout these processes, multi-
layered negotiations and consultations with shifting centres overshadow formal
powers.
Owing to these institutional characteristics, the EU is open to and, indeed,
in need of points of reference that guide actors’ behavior and further their co-
operation. Precisely because of its heterogeneous composition and complex
institutional set-up, regimes58 that reduce the complexity of decision situations
and form a more or less fixed set of reference points are crucial.59 Within the
formal treaty framework, processes of co-operation and informal principles and
norms have evolved that contribute to the convergence of expectations and
behavior. First, a fundamental set of principles and norms revolves around the
whole range of the EU institutional set up and all of its policy areas. These
institutional and distributive principles and norms give orientation to the actors
when it comes to questions related to the allocation and use of powers, to
appropriate procedures and to the fairness of outcomes. They provide for the
actors’ fair and efficient participation in decision making and for fair results of
these processes. Second, there are more specific principles, norms and concepts
that are important guiding posts within and across specific policy areas. These
substantial concepts relate primarily to the content of a policy, the goals to be
attained and the instruments to be employed. They concern the appropriateness
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of the EU rules. Considering the heterogeneity of the actors involved in EU
decision-making they serve as persistent “focal points” and guide political
action in specific issue areas. Thereby, they ensure some coherence and
continuity in EU policies. Policy concepts, institutional principles and
distributive criteria greatly shaped the negotiations leading to the liberalization
of the EU electricity markets and helped to overcome the fervent initial
resistance towards the regulatory reform. On the one hand, they rendered certain
preferences and outcomes illegitimate and hindered the member states’ pursuit
of such preferences. On the other hand, they furthered the learning processes
and preference changes of the member states.
3.2 Policy Concepts and the Commission’s Right to Initiate EU Policies
As a result of the heterogeneous background conditions in the member states
policy concepts have a special relevance for guiding actors’ orientations. The
actors need not necessarily agree on “all the definitions of the central
problems”, rather what is needed is “sufficient overlap” for any policy concept
to become a “successful dominant approach”.60 Even if these concepts are
multidimensional they guide orientations with regard to the content of a policy,
the goals to be attained and the instruments to be employed. In environmental
policy, the concept of sustainable development provided a focal point for the
convergence of expectations guiding political action.61 In social policy, the
social dimension of the internal market fulfilled a similar function and
galvanized agreement on the Social Protocol of the Maastricht Treaty.62 In EU
technology policy, the network concept has contributed to the spread of co-
operative research projects in the European Union. Among these substantial
concepts, EU market integration is of primordinary importance. It is not
confined to one policy area but travels across issue areas and economic sectors.
The liberalization of the electricity supply industry was part and parcel of the
EU Internal Market Programme whose beneficial economic impact is almost
taken for granted and which has enjoyed broad support across the member states
since the mid-1980s because it is embedded in a neoliberal policy agenda and
rooted in the founding treaties. Therefore, measures aimed at market integration
are considered to be highly legitimate in the EU context. They form the
backbone of European integration and the dominant economic policy doctrine
since the early 1980s. They guide the actors orientations and behavior in such a
way that they are unable to refuse such measures even if the scope of negative
integration is extended to economic sectors that have developed their own
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principles and rationality criteria - such as the electricity supply industry. The
central position of market integration among EU policies acted as a catalyst for
the initiative to liberalize the network bound energies, which was also justified
by the precedents other sectors, such as telecommunications, had set.
Among the EU institutions, the European Commission is the ‘traffic
center’ for the adoption and diffusion of policy concepts. Its right of initiative
grants the Commission a central position in the phases of agenda setting and
policy formulation: „Within the broad framework of the treaties it will decide
whether, when, and in which direction European rules and regulations ought to
be generated“.63 As a consequence of its competition policy responsibilities, the
Commission acquired an excellent knowledge of the British reform. However,
due to the intensity and the scope of this reform, which had included a change
of ownership, a restructuring of the industry, the setting up of a new regulatory
agency and of a specific trading mechanism, the British model could not be
transferred directly to the EU level. Nevertheless, informed about the initial
French interest in increasing electricity exports, the interest of large industrial
consumers in lowering their electricity costs and the British reform, the
Commission developed a liberalization agenda for the EU electricity supply
industry. The Commission’s main point of reference was a development specific
to the EU. It mainly transferred the Internal Market Programme to the electricity
sector. The Commission justified the creation of an Internal Energy Market with
the opportunity costs of a “Non-Europe” in this sector as well as with positive
effects for the EU industry and consumers.64
Due to the central role of market integration, the member states were
unable to oppose the initiative entirely and had at the very least to discuss it.
However, the great resistance of the state actors and the utilities towards the
Commission initiative indicates that even the high legitimacy of the
liberalization doctrine would not necessarily guarantee the success of the
endeavour. Therefore, the impact of other factors, namely the institutional
principles and fairness criteria, needs to be considered in more detail.
3.3 Institutional Principles: the Consensus Principle
Institutional principles shape actors’ orientations and beliefs about what
constitutes legitimacy in the EU political system and what supports its claim to
make binding decisions.65 The principles refer mainly to the participation of the
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actors and to the decision rules in the negotiation processes. The participation
of the different EU bodies, the inclusion of societal actors and the consensus
principle within the Council of the EU shall bridge the actors’ heterogeneity and
their cleavage lines. Even if majority decisions are increasingly common in the
Council since the Single European Act, and the Maastricht and the Amsterdam
treaties, its decision-making practices are still characterized by a search for
consensus to find solutions that are acceptable for all member states.66 The
possibility of taking a decision by qualified majority certainly enhances the
Council’s propensity to reach an agreement because the „possibility of breaking
deadlocks by voting drives the negotiators to break the deadlocks without
actually resorting to the vote“.67 Nevertheless, with heterogeneous situations in
the member states, multi dimensional cleavage lines, manifold issues to be
negotiated, a dynamic political agenda and unclear and unstable preferences of
the member states, the consensus principle warrants not only ‘comprehensive
protection’ against being outvoted in important issues or even continuously.68 It
also allows for a search for problem solutions that all member states consider as
appropriate and fair, and which ensures compliance with such rules. Therefore,
the EU institutions and the member states alike consider the consensus principle
to be both appropriate and rational.
The choice of the decision procedure in this case confirms that the
participation and the consensus principles have informed the EU actors’
behavior. The Commission could choose among four different procedures. First,
it could have applied the EU competition rules of Art. 85, 86 EEC-treaty against
the utilities. Secondly, it was entitled to initiate infringement procedures
according to Art. 169 EEC against the member states. Thirdly, it had the formal
power to unilaterally formulate a Commission directive based on Art. 90 (3)
EEC. Finally, it was able to propose a directive on the basis of Art. 100a EEC-
Treaty that would allow for the participation of the other EU bodies in the
liberalization process. Why then had the Commission mainly recourse to the
fourth of these procedures to open up the EU electricity markets?
The member states and the utilities as well as the European Parliament
and the largest part of the Commission preferred a procedure that would involve
all of the EU bodies. The large majority of the actors perceived the application
of EU competition law as both procedurally and substantially inadequate for
opening up electricity markets. The application of EU competition law is the
domain of the Competition Directorate-General (DG IV). In contrast to most of
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the other Commission services, DG IV’s bureaucratic culture is highly
legalistic.69 Within the Commission, DG IV is the most visible exception to the
participation and consensus oriented approach. The Competition Directorate-
General suggested applying EU competition law and Art. 90 (3) EEC to the
electricity market while DG XVII, which is responsible for energy policy, opted
for market opening on the basis of Art. 100a EEC. The planned unilateral action
of DG IV that followed its own precedent in the telecommunications sector
faced fierce resistance from the European Parliament and the member states.
Due to the economic relevance of the sector and to its quasi-public status in
many member states, these signaled to block the use of Art. 90 (3) EEC.70 The
only member state wholeheartedly supporting the EU reform – the United
Kingdom – was also unwilling to tolerate unilateral action by the Commission.71
This indicates that the preferences for consensus do not depend on situational
calculations but on fundamental institutional considerations. Both the Council
of the EU and the European Parliament emphasized the need to proceed
consensually, to involve all of the EU bodies in the negotiations, and to consult
the sectoral actors extensively. Therefore, and based on a large majority in a
collegiate meeting, the Commission refused DG IV’s envisaged approach and
proposed instead a stepwise procedure in co-operation with the Council and
with the European Parliament.72
After this decision had been taken, DG IV initiated infringement
proceedings against some of the member states so as to maintain a high degree
of pressure on them and on the European Parliament whose socialist majority
fraction was hesitant with regard to the liberalization of the sector.73 These
proceedings should support the directive negotiations but could in themselves
not provide for an appropriate problem solution because their functionality for
the market opening was rather limited. On the one hand, DG IV referred only
five member states (France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain) for the
infringement of treaty obligations to the ECJ and these referrals were limited to
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but one isolated aspect of the liberalization – legal  import and export
monopolies. On the other hand, this strategy depended on the support of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) whose opinion could not be predicted. In two
related cases (Almelo and Corbeau), the ECJ had rather unsurprisingly decided
that the Community rules on the four market freedoms also applied to utilities.
But in its judgements, the Court had maintained that these firms could be
exempted from competition in order to maintain “sufficient financial
equilibrium to guarantee the provision of public services”.74 In these
judgements, the ECJ did not specify the criteria for exemption and left the final
decision to the discretion of the national courts. Therefore, the interpretation of
these judgements differed across the economic actors, the member states and the
Commission.75 Among EU bodies, the member states, and the firms there was
some uncertainty about the ECJ judgements in the infringement cases.
Nevertheless, according to the member state officials, the legal strategy to open
up the market did not appear entirely credible,76 so that DG IV’s strategy could
increase the pressure on the negotiations only to a limited degree.
Unlike in the Art. 177 EEC procedures related to the Almelo and Corbeau
cases, in the infringement procedures the ECJ itself had to formulate the case
specific rulings. That the ECJ did not rule against any of these import and
export monopolies in its 1997 rulings confirms the limited credibility of the
competition policy route. In fact, even after the member states had already
agreed on a directive to liberalize the sector, the ECJ still held that the member
states could maintain the most essential aspects of their national export and
import monopolies. The European Court of Justice regarded these trade
monopolies as violations of the EU rules on market integration but it accepted
their maintenance if they were necessary to enable the utilities to perform tasks
of general economic interest assigned to them by the member states.77
In sum, the decision procedure, which involved agreement on a directive
by both the European Parliament and the Council of the EU and in which the
utilities were to be consulted guaranteed not only that the claims of all EU
bodies to participate in the process were taken into account. For all of the
actors, political negotiations among the EU institutions also promised a higher
degree of control over the outcome and a more adequate regulatory solution
than a legal strategy would allow.
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The consensus principle was not confined to the choice of the decision
procedure, it also informed the decision-making processes within the Council of
the EU. As a result of the implementation of the Maastricht treaty, in our case
the co-operation procedure had been turned into the co-decision procedure that
allows qualified majority voting in the Council. But due to the heterogeneity of
national structures and the economic relevance of the industry the member
states were not prepared to outvote each other on such a salient issue. Even the
main antagonists in the debate, Germany and France, agreed “not to isolate one
another” during the Council negotiations but to search for a consensual solution
of all member states.78 They refrained from attempts to mobilize a qualified
majority in favor of the directive and from the option of constructing a blocking
minority against it which existed until the very end of the negotiations. In the
end, the member states agreed on the directive in a consensual manner. Thus,
the informal consensus principle had a greater relevance for the negotiations
than the formal procedures that were open to the Commission and to the
member states and which would have allowed them to pursue their issue
specific interests.
However, the participation of the different EU bodies in decision making
and the consensus principle in the Council of the EU need not necessarily lead
to agreements and to effective problem solutions. In contrast: the consensus
principle may even support the veto-orientations of individual actors. As it is
almost impossible for the member states to exit from EU negotiations, a
persistent blockade of decisions is possible, as Fritz W. Scharpf has
convincingly argued in his analysis of the EU ‘joint decision trap’.79 Therefore,
an analysis of negotiation techniques in the Council will supplement that of the
institutional principles since these techniques restrain the unilateral pursuit of
member state interests and even change their preferences.
3.4 Incremental Negotiation Techniques and Regulatory Learning in the
Council of the EU
Let us first once again recall the basic tenets of the intergovernmental approach
and of approaches devoted to the analysis of policy making in the EU. In the
intergovernmental approach, member states’ preferences are essentially taken as
given. Agreements are reached on the basis of differential power positions and
mutual concessions in a given bargaining space.80 Policy analyses that pay more
attention to institutional factors in EU policymaking paint a strikingly similar
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picture of the Council negotiations. ‘Opposing national interests and goals often
only allow for solutions based on a least common denominator basis, on mutual
exchanges and on comprehensive package deals’.81 Even analyses that ascribe a
relatively great action capacity to the European Union do not relate this to the
Council negotiations, but to the autonomous role of the Commission, the
influence of scientific experts, and even to member state hopes that they need
not really implement EU legal acts.82
These perspectives contain several elements that explain why member
states may arrive at joint decisions. Nevertheless, recalling the initial
preferences of the member states, only the United Kingdom and Ireland opted
for a comprehensive liberalization of the electricity market. Thus, the initial
negotiation space would not have allowed the adoption of a joint decision in
favor of liberalization. Therefore, the following section provides evidence that
the embeddedness of the member states in the EU negotiation setting
systematically hinders a unilateral pursuit of interests and changes their
preferences. In the Council and its administrative sub-structure a special mode
of interaction evolved, which allows for the resolution of complicated
negotiation problems and massive conflicts of interest. So far neglected, but of
special interest are the (1) incremental negotiation techniques of the Council.83
These generate a particular negotiation dynamic, trigger regulatory learning
effects of the member states, and result in regulatory solutions typical for the
European Union. Compared to them, (2) the member states’ role changes
during their term of the Council presidency and the (3) moderation  of the
Council debate by the European Commission are quite well known. These three
components of the Council negotiations are closely related but they must be
disentangled because they have divergent implications.
(1) The Council proceedings are structured by incremental negotiation
techniques. Due to time constraints, the Council working groups, COREPER,
and the Council of Ministers itself cannot discuss more than three to four
aspects of the Commission directive proposals during a tour de table.
Therefore, and as a result of the multilateral character of the EU, the
multiplicity of national positions are grouped into small bundles of
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controversial issues for which compromise proposals are debated. This
procedural structuration has important implications for the resolution of
member state conflicts. First, it decouples the controversial problems from the
underlying national structures and from individual member state interests. It
provides for the formulation of types and categories of problems as well as
solutions rather than for a debate of highly idiosyncratic situations. Thereby, it
leads to a rather abstract and analytical debate about these categories and, in
part, delegitimizes modes of argumentation that rest on specific national
situations. Those member states willing to defend their national settings are
forced to come up with proposals that not only reflect their own domestic
structure, but can also be applicable in and acceptable to the other member
states. Thus, embeddedness in the Council debates limits the range of legitimate
arguments available to the member states. This dynamic is perhaps best
illustrated by the debate on the French Single Buyer proposal. In order to
defend the main institutional features of its nationalized electricity supply
structure and win the support of member states with similar structures, the
French Industry Ministry needed to bring up a proposal that was conceived as a
general alternative to the Commission’s proposal. The French proposal was
detached from the French domestic structure and its general elements were
subsequently analyzed and compared to the Commission’s own proposal. Based
on a study commissioned by an independent energy policy think tank, the
Commission was then in a position to demand important changes to the French
Single Buyer proposal. Finally, the Council accepted the Single Buyer in
principle, though in a substantially modified form.
The second consequence of isolating problem bundles is the Council’s
sequential approach to dealing with disagreements. The debate starts with those
proposals that are immediately solvable and tractable and gradually proceeds to
the more controversial issues. The least contested issues are negotiated in an
iterative process and settled by the six-monthly Council conclusions. The
resulting solutions then become part of the “acquis of the dossier” and are no
longer open for renegotiation. Backtracking behind interim agreements is
generally not possible and the negotiations stay focused on open problems. The
Council negotiations generate their own momentum because they build up
several specific solutions and point out remaining problem areas. The iterative
negotiation technique makes for regular interim negotiation successes, which
forestall a break-up of the negotiations since several issues have already been
cleared and since the remaining problems have been concretized. For example,
during the negotiations of the liberalization directive, the incremental
negotiation technique led to the deletion of the initial 185 member state
reservations to the amended Commission proposal.RSC 2000/26 © 2000 Rainer Eising 28
Thirdly, the iterative debate and the successive solution of a variety of
problems increase the member states’ knowledge of the dossier and of the
problems involved. The successive negotiation rounds generally lead the main
actors to re-evaluate gradually both the Commission’s proposals and their own
domestic regulatory regime so that their assessments of the envisaged regulation
and of the domestic setting may change during the course of the negotiations.
The continuous debate about the pros and cons of every single detail of each
member state’s sector systematically induces learning processes and preference
changes. The incremental debate increases the knowledge about the individual
elements of the often highly complex regulatory proposals. It also reduces
uncertainty about the effects on multidimensional domestic structures.
Therefore, the incremental techniques of isolating problem bundles place the
initial member state preferences and their domestic settings more and more into
a test stand. New information about the situation in the other member states and
the pressure to analyze the domestic situation in the light of the Commission
proposals often result in re-assessments of the efficiency of national
arrangements. This can help the resolution of initially intractable conflicts. This
can, but does not necessarily lead to greater acceptance of the EU framework.
In the case of France, the Ministry of Industry turned away from an initial
short-term economic rationality that emphasized the gains from electricity
exports, towards a more fundamental set of institutional considerations. It
emphasized the principles of the French nationalized system of electricity
supply but was also prepared to provide for a limited opening of the French
electricity market as its Single Buyer proposal indicates. Similarly, Ireland
moved from an initial support of the liberalization to a more defensive posture
and tried to seek exemptions as a ‘small electricity system’.
By contrast, learning processes that started within the Council debates
explain the fundamental preference change of the German Federal Economics
Ministry. Initially, the Ministry’s orientation was shaped by the long stability of
the German sectoral regime that had excluded competition. The sedimentation
of the sectoral institutions outweighed the fact that the Commission’s
liberalization plans fit very well with the liberal tenets of the German economic
policy doctrine of a Social Market Economy and with the debate on the
strengthening of the German industry in an era of economic globalization. As a
result of the EU initiative the Ministry no longer rigidly defended the domestic
institutions but argued for a comprehensive sectoral reform.84 The Ministry’s
involvement in the EU negotiations formed an important mechanism for the
transmission of the liberalization doctrine to the national level. It led to a
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changing assessment of the economic rationality of competition within the
network bound energy sectors.85 As a result of this debate, the assumption of
technical and economic peculiarities that had been taken for granted and had
justified the sector’s exclusion from competition appeared less and less
convincing.86
Further ideational factors complemented this re-evaluation: First, British
privatization from 1990 onwards had an important demonstration effect: it
showed that competition could be introduced into the electricity sector without
endangering the security of supply and was greatly valued by the BMW
officials. The British reform completely undermined the general argument that
competition could not really work in the sector due to its economic and
technical features. Secondly, at the domestic level electricity liberalization
became linked to the broader debate about the competitiveness of German
industry and ‘production site Germany’ (Standort Deutschland) which had been
launched by the national producers’ association, Bundesverband Deutscher
Industrie, in the late 1980s. This debate had gained momentum in the 1990s due
both to the economic structural crisis in the new German Länder and the
perception of growing pressure from economic globalization. In the context of
the European debate and of the debate on globalization, reform proposals by
national expert commissions gained in importance. Reports by the Deregulation
Commission and by the Monopoly Commission also recommended the
liberalization of these sectors.87 Their input provided additional legitimacy for a
sectoral reform. Considering the radical nature of the sectoral reform, the
reports of these well-renowned commissions confirmed the overhaul of the
‘conventional wisdom’. Neither similar proposals made by practically the same
set of experts in the 1960s and 1970s88 nor political pressure from the large
industrial consumers in the 1980s had resulted in political reform.89 The German
Federal Economics Ministry was also more open to the Commission proposals
than the French Ministry of Industry because these plans were largely
compatible with the idea of a Social Market Economy, while in France, the
Service Public tradition forestalled their acceptance. On the basis of the EU
negotiations and of the national reform proposals, the Economics Ministry
proposed a national reform whose scope went even beyond the Commission
plans. Therefore, one may safely conclude that the Ministry did not just bend to
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negotiation pressures in the Council of the EU but planned the reform
voluntarily as a result of a learning process.
(2) Moreover, the role changes of the member states during their term of
the Council presidency lead them to sort out potential areas of compromise and
to work towards reconciliation.90 It is largely the Council presidencies who
structure the negotiations, isolate the problem bundles and search for the
solution of open problems in the iterative negotiations. Incumbent member
states that hold the Council presidency are expected to suppress the pursuit of
their own interests and search for areas of agreement. Co-ordination within the
‘troika’ is supposed to ensure the continuity of the process. As the holders of
successive Council presidencies, even France and Germany had to abstain from
pursuing their own preferences and to put forward compromise proposals. In the
final phase of the negotiations, the Spanish and the Italian presidencies
concretized important elements of the liberalization proposals and devised some
compromise proposals. It is not only during the phase of the Council presidency
that these role changes support the evolution of compromise positions. They let
the understanding for the other member states’ positions grow even if the
member states’ differences in the underlying interests persist.91 Thus, they give
rise to empathy – the member states develop a capacity for participating in one
another’s perceptions and definitions of the situation.92
(3) The Commission is also present throughout these negotiations and, by
mediating during the debate, attempts to facilitate the formulation of a
negotiation solution. Even if it keeps its own perceptions and interests in mind
while doing so, as a guardian of the treaties the Commission, from the point of
view of the member states, enjoys a neutral status which gives a high degree of
legitimacy to its arguments. To support its own position in favor of the sectoral
liberalization, it based its reasoning on the expertise of a well respected Energy
Economics Institute that compared the French Single Buyer model to the
Commission model.93 Based on earlier studies by this institute which had argued
for the introduction of competition into the sector,94 the Commission could be
reasonably assured that the Institute would support its own model.
Subsequently, on the basis of the Institute’s study, the Commission demanded
far reaching changes to the original French proposal which were largely
accepted by the member states. As a result, the French Single Buyer model was
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greatly modified. Even Electricité de France no longer considered it as a real
alternative to the Commission model of negotiated third party access,95 and
most of the member states are going to implement the Commission model.96
Finally, as a consequence of the incremental negotiation technique at
work within the Council system the most important and most conflictual issues
are gradually isolated. For these issues, not only package deals within the
dossier but also issue linkages across policy areas become virtually impossible
because the open questions are so central to the negotiation partners. Cross-
issue or cross-area package deals presuppose not only that the actors accept the
linkage of unrelated issues but require also “complementary asymmetries” in
other dossiers or policy areas which are difficult to find. Furthermore, the
member state actors in different Councils of the EU would need to accept
compromises on issues whose benefits are accruing “outside of their own
field”.97 Therefore, issue linkages and package deals are only of limited use in
the daily business of the European institutions and are restricted to rather
special cases.
Much more important are concessions in the form of flexibilization
elements to moor the ‘loose ends’ of the negotiations. Such flexibilization
mechanisms – the inclusion of open textured or general legal clauses and of
alternative regulatory options as well as the granting of administrative
discretion, transition periods, and exemptions - have two main functions. Apart
from aiding conflict resolution in the Council debate they are intended to allow
for a flexible implementation in heterogeneous national contexts. To resolve
member state conflicts, these mechanisms matter most when not all but only a
single or a few member states are involved. They privilege these states and need
to be justified in terms of uneven abilities or for technical reasons.98
3.5 Fairness Criteria: the Equity of the Market Opening
As a result of the consensus principle, fairness criteria have special relevance
for the resolution of distributive conflicts among the member states. The
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perception of the fairness or the unfairness of a planned regulation impinges
greatly upon its acceptance.99 Not only in international regimes, but also in EU
negotiations reciprocity criteria form an important yardstick for measuring the
fairness of a regulatory outcome. As a consequence of reciprocity criteria, the
member states consider a unilateral maximization of utility as illegitimate and
accept normative standards that hold for all of them. Only equivalent exchange
values are accepted as a result of the Council negotiations. In his seminal article
on this topic, Robert Keohane distinguished among two types of reciprocity:
specific reciprocity and diffuse reciprocity.100 In cases of specific reciprocity,
the partners exchange goods with equivalent values in a fixed sequence. In
cases of diffuse reciprocity, the equivalence of the exchange need not be
symmetric and the sequence is open.
In bilateral and single-issue negotiations specific reciprocity can easily be
realized and verified. However, in a multilateral setting with a multitude of
negotiation issues the equivalence of contributions can often not be resolved.
Therefore, in the Council of the EU specific reciprocity cannot be related cost-
benefit-equilibrium of the member states across all issue areas. To reduce their
uncertainty about the fairness of the envisaged regulation and to arrive at a joint
decision, it is therefore important for the member states to agree on the
reference point and on the normative basis of the reciprocity criterion. I suggest
that the reference point of reciprocity is either the contribution of the
negotiation partners to the aspired problem solution or their portion of the costs.
So far, only the equality of states has been regarded as normative basis of
reciprocity. This neglects the fact that many international organizations also
consider differential capacities of their members, which must therefore be
regarded as a second important normative basis of reciprocity. Combining the
equality and the capacity dimensions with the cost sharing portion and the
contribution to the problem solution results in a four-fold-matrix (see table 1).
On the one hand, the sovereignty principle and the equality of states is the
normative starting point for many forms of international co-operation. For
example, in EU environmental regulation, the member states have to contribute
equally to a certain level of environmental protection by implementing the EU
clean air or clean water standards (table 1, upper left field). On the other hand,
several international organizations also consider the differential capacities of
their members when formulating such standards. Thus, in several areas of the
world trade regime, developing countries need to reduce their tariffs to a lesser
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degree than industrialized nations (table 1, lower left field).101 The financing
mechanism of the EU is a good example for considering differential capacities
when reciprocity is related to the sharing of costs. A large part of the EU’s own
financial means rest on contributions of the member states that are
proportionately related to their value-added taxes or to their gross domestic
product (table 1, lower right field). In this way, all the member states bear the
same relative costs.
Specific reciprocity does not necessarily encourage co-operation. In
contrast, given the prevalence of the consensus principle in the EU, it may result
in decision blockages. Diffuse reciprocity, by contrast does not fix the
equivalence and the sequence of the exchange as precisely as specific
reciprocity.102 It therefore improves the likelihood of co-operation even if the
values to be exchanged are not equivalent. In this context, Niklas Luhman’s
argument about trust also holds for diffuse reciprocity: both allow for forms of
co-operation that may not prove immediately useful for the actors.103
Table 1: Specific Reciprocity in the European Union
Reference point of reciprocity
Contribution to problem
solution




equality Equal contribution or
equal standards
same absolute costs
capacity Contribution or standard
according to capacity
same relative costs
As already suggested, both forms of reciprocity are interrelated in a specific
way. As diffuse reciprocity cannot be realized in a multilateral and multi-issue
environment, all the member states initially emphasize criteria of specific
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reciprocity to ensure the fairness of each individual EU regulation. Therefore,
the Council of the European Union formulated several conditions to ensure
specific reciprocity in the opening of the national electricity markets. It
demanded (1) the equivalence of economic results, (2) the equivalence of the
national market opening and of the access to these markets, as well as (3)
conformity with the treaty rules of the parallel existence of the Single Buyer
model and the Commission’s model.104 In other words, the Council interpreted
specific reciprocity in the context of market integration, which ought to limit
deviant behavior and the ability of individual member states to formulate
alternative decisions. Even if these criteria did not exactly prescribe the degree
and the content of market opening, they formed an institutionalized focal point
during the negotiations. More and more, specific reciprocity was related to a
similar degree of market opening, and finally a quota for the degree of
liberalization in all of the member states was formulated. Thereby, all the
member states were supposed to contribute equally to the problem of opening
the Internal Energy Market. This focal point directed the attention of the
member states to certain dimensions of the directive proposal. The reciprocity
criterion weakened the generic discussion about the appropriateness of the
liberalization as such and focused the member states’ attention upon the fairness
dimension of the proposal. Due to this re-orientation the member states could
gradually formulate quantitative criteria for the sectoral liberalization which had
not been included in the earlier Commission proposal. That the criterion of
specific reciprocity justified several fundamental changes to the French Single
Buyer proposal illustrates the high degree of legitimacy that it enjoys among the
member states. The neutrality of the Commission and the scientific evidence
from the Energy Economics Institute in Cologne further supported the detailed
amendments to the French concept.
Despite successive agreements on several aspects of market opening, the
Franco-German conflict forestalled agreement amongst the member states for a
long time. After they proved unable to resolve their differences in a series of
bilateral negotiations at the working level and at the ministerial level, the
German Bundeskanzler and the French president finally agreed on the
liberalization. This change in the decision making level had largely a symbolic
function and signaled to the sectoral firms and trade associations that the pursuit
of sectoral interests would not justify a blockade of the overall integration
process. The techniques of consensus formation in the Council and the
embeddedness in EU institutional principles and fairness criteria had
increasingly led these actors to perceive that it was no longer appropriate to
maximize national-sectoral interests. The French president and the German
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Bundeskanzler stepped back from a sector-orientation and sanctioned the
outcome of the Council negotiations without adding substantial changes to the
directive proposal. Such modifications would have been considered as
inadequate and illegitimate by the other member states. The Franco-German
agreement sub-ordinated their domestic sectoral costs and the specific
reciprocity criterion to a more diffuse political reciprocity in the integration
process. Their long-term co-operation and their reputation as ‘motors of
integration’ let them consider any unilateral pursuit of sectoral interests as
inappropriate. Thus, the differentiation of the EU institutional set-up into
different layers of decision-making can modify the relevant rationality and
fairness criteria. In this way, the institutional differentiation can sometimes
lower decision barriers and blockages.
Conclusion
The intergovernmental approach claims that the analysis of EU negotiations can
be reduced to studying the pursuit of relatively stable member state preferences
that are formed on the basis of domestic structures or domestic interest
coalitions. Since it conceives of the member states’ interest definitions in this
rather static way it seems ill-equipped to cope with preference changes
endogenous to EU negotiations. The article has demonstrated that even in issues
not suitable to policy learning because they involve entrenched interests and
stable domestic arrangements, the positions and preferences of indeed those
member states that occupy a central position in the bargaining processes can
change substantially, as happened in the case of both France and Germany. In
many respects, such changes are not related to the evolution of technical or
economic factors or to shifting interest alliances. They are either positional
adaptations to the dynamic evolution of the EU political agenda or are learning
processes by actors whose rationality is bounded. Learning processes are
particularly likely to occur if the planned EU regulations or directives promote
rather new ideas, are quite complex or if the domestic situations are multi-
dimensional so that neither the EU rules nor their impact on the domestic
structures can be easily assessed. These learning processes are likely to cause
member state preferences to change if they reveal a limited efficiency of or
inconsistencies amongst domestic arrangements. Often, more context specific
and complementary expertise on the domestic level will be necessary to
stabilize such preference changes.
A neo-institutional approach is appropriate for conceptualizing such
learning processes because it is able to take into account the impact of the EU
institutional set-up on the preference formation of the member states. This
article has highlighted informal institutional characteristics that further co-RSC 2000/26 © 2000 Rainer Eising 36
operation and aid the evolution of joint behavioral standards: policy-concepts
such as market integration; institutional principles such as the consensus
principle; fairness criteria such as reciprocity. Furthermore, the incremental
negotiation techniques in the Council of the EU hinder the unilateral pursuit of
national interests and lead to learning processes and preference changes on part
of the member states.
As a result of incremental negotiations, the EU legal acts contain several
flexibilization mechanisms, without merely being a menu à la carte. They
contain several provisions, which all member states have to implement and
which must be considered as a regulatory core. These core rules limit the
directives’ degree of flexibilization and guarantee their uniform validity across
all member states. In this way, it is the quotas for market opening which ensure
that the member states must gradually liberalize their markets.
Consensual agreement on the directive, its flexibilization elements and
the sanction potential of the EU legal system largely guarantee formal and
effective implementation. In several member states, market opening clearly
surpasses the minimum requirements of the directive.105. Moreover,
liberalization triggers far-reaching behavioral changes on part of the sectoral
firms that are beyond the scope of the directive’s content. To name just a few
developments: In some member states, electricity spot markets were set up;
cross-border investments and also domestic mergers and acquisitions increased
substantially; many utilities restructured their organizations and reduced
overhead costs; prices for industrial consumers have been substantially reduced;
and long term contractual relations between the machinery sector and the
utilities have broken down. However, in areas outside of market integration the
competition mechanism does not apply so that behavioral changes as a
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